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Answers to the questions for the hearing in the case 
of Janowiec and Others v. Russia
(joint cases nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09) 
Strasbourg, 6 October 2011
On 6 October 2011, the European Court on Human Right held a hearing 
in the joint cases of Janowiec and Trybowski v. Russia (application no. 55508/07) 
and Wołk–Jezierska and Others v. Russia (application no. 29520/09). The historical 
background for these two cases was the Katyń Massacre committed in 1940, when 
21,857 Polish citizens were murdered, pursuant to a decision taken on 5 March 
1940 by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party. 
The Russian Federation ratiﬁ ed the European Convention on Human Rights 
on 5 March 1998. The applicants alleged that the Russian investigation into the 
Katyń Massacre, which had started in 1990 and was discontinued in 2004, was 
not eﬃ  cient as required by the Convention (violation of Article 2). Furthermore, 
they complained that the way the Russian authorities reacted to their requests 
and enquiries amounted to denigrating and inhuman treatment (violation of Arti-
cle 3). Lastly, they claimed that the refusal of the Russian government to disclose 
documents from the Russian investigation into the massacre, which the Court had 
requested, could constitute a violation of Article 38 of the Convention (obligation 
to co-operate with the Court).
Before the hearing, the Court asked the participants (applicants, Russian 
government and the government of Poland, which joined the case as a third party) 
a number of questions to be answered. These questions related to important issues 
relevant to the case but also very crucial for the application of the Convention as 
such (in particular, competence ratione temporis of the Court). A recording of the 
hearing is available on the website of the Court (www.echr.coe.int). 
Each participant had only 30 minutes to summarise its legal observations. 
An extended version of the answers was submitted to the Court in writing. Be-
low are presented the legal observations prepared on behalf of the applicants. The 
author of this document is Professor Ireneusz C. Kamiński from the Institute of 
Legal Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland. In Strasbourg, he acted 
in his capacity as a legal representative for the applicants.
Article 2 of the Convention
1. Does the Court have [temporal] jurisdiction to assess the respondent State’s 
compliance with the procedural obligations ﬂ owing from Article 2 of the Con-
vention? 
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 (a) The parties are invited in particular to comment on whether or not the 
Court’s jurisdiction can be founded on the “humanitarian clause” in the last 
subparagraph of paragraph 163 in Šilih v. Slovenia ] ([GC], no. 71463/01, 
9 April 2009).
 More speciﬁ cally,
 (i) Can the mass murder of Polish prisoners be characterised as a “war crime”?
1.1. The Katyń massacre was committed in 1940. In total, at least 21,857 people 
were killed. The majority of the individuals executed, i.e. 14,552, among them the 
applicants’ relatives, were kept before the killing in three prisoner-of-war camps. 
1.2. When the war started in September 1939, its participants had a duty to abide 
by the rules of military law (humanitarian law). At that time the basic precepts of 
international humanitarian law were contained in the IV Hague Convention respect-
ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land (and especially its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land) of 18 October 1907, and in the 
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929.
1.3. The provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions set forth fundamen-
tal and universal principles regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. Under 
these principles prisoners of war remained under the power of the hostile State 
(government), and not that of the individuals and formations who had captured 
them. Prisoners of war were to be treated humanely at all times and especially, as 
stated in Article 2 of the Geneva Convention, protected against “acts of violence, 
from insults and from public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them [were] 
forbidden.” Prisoners of war were entitled to respect of their persons and honour 
(Article 3). Also Article 4 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare stated that 
“Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the indi-
viduals or corps who capture them. They must be humanely treated...”
1.4. The provisions of the two Conventions also regulated the conditions under 
which prisoners of war were to be held and the possibility of applying penal sanc-
tions against them. Regarding the latter issue, it was generally believed that pris-
oners of war were subject to the regulations and orders that applied to the army 
of the country under whose authority they were held (Article 8 of the Hague 
Convention, Article 45 of the Geneva Convention). Nevertheless, in the applica-
tion of disciplinary measures, corporal punishment and cruelty in any form was 
forbidden. Collective punishment for the deeds of an individual was also forbid-
den (Article 46 of the Geneva Convention).
1.5. Special protection was accorded to the rights of prisoners of war in court 
proceedings, whereby they were entitled to defence and to the presence of 
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representatives of the caretaker powers in their proceedings. They also had a guar-
anteed right of appeal against their sentences at the same level as the members of 
the armed forces of the country in which they were detained (Chapter III of the 
Geneva Convention). 
1.6. Although the two Conventions do not contain a rule that expressly prohibits 
killings of prisoners of war kept in detention centres, it belongs to the very funda-
mentals of legal argumentation that from the prohibitions of cruel treatment and 
of killing in direct post-combat situations also ensued the prohibition of killing those 
already held in prisoner-of-war camps (a fortiori reasoning). Moreover, the preamble 
to the IV Hague Convention provides that in cases not included in the Regulation 
“the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the 
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilised 
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”
1.7. The soldiers captured by the Red Army in 1939 were entitled to prisoner-of-
war status, and therefore to the full protection reserved for prisoners of war. In 
Russian too these soldiers were termed “prisoners of war”  and 
the Soviet institution set up for the management of detention centres was the 
Administration for Prisoners’ of War and Internees’ Aﬀ airs (  
1.8. In 1939, the Republic of Poland was party to the two Conventions. However, 
the fact that the USSR was party neither to the IV Hague Convention (and to the 
Regulations appended thereto) nor to the Geneva Convention did not release that 
country from the duty to respect the universally binding principles of internation-
al customary law, which existed side by side with treaty obligations. 
1.9. The legal status of norms contained in the IV Hague and Geneva Convention 
was addressed during the post-war trials. In 1946 the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal stated (Goering and Others Trial) with regard to the Hague Con-
vention of 1907: “The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention undoubtedly 
represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their adoption. 
But the Convention expressly stated that it was an attempt ‘to revise the general laws 
and customs of war’, which it thus recognised to be then existing, but by 1939 these 
rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all civilised nations, and were 
regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war which are referred to in 
Article 6 (b) of the Charter.”1
1  The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal judgement (Goering and Others 
Trial), published in: Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribu-
nal, Nuremberg 1947, vol. XXII, p. 497. 
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In another part of its judgement the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that: “Ar-
ticle 6(b) of the Charter provides that ‘ill-treatment (...) of civilian population of or 
in occupied territory (...) killing of hostages (...) wanton destruction of cities, towns 
or villages’ shall be a war crime. In the main these provisions are merely declaratory 
of the existing laws of war as expressed by the Hague Convention.”2
The opinion of the International Military Tribunal was subsequently sub-
stantially adopted by the United States Military Tribunal in the High Command 
Trial (Case of Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Others)3 and the Krupp Trial.4
1.10. As far as the Geneva Convention is concerned, in the High Command Tri-
al the United States Military Tribunal, while reconstructing the position of the 
International Military Tribunal in the Goering and Others Case, stated that the 
Geneva Convention “was not binding between Germany and Russia as a contractual 
agreement, but that the general principles of International Law as outlined in those 
Conventions were applicable. In other words, it would appear that the International 
Military Tribunal in the case above cited [Goering and Others], followed the same 
lines of thought with regards to the Geneva Convention as with respect to the Hague 
Convention to the eﬀ ect that they were binding insofar as they were in substance an 
expression of International Law as accepted by the civilised nations of the world, and 
this Tribunal adopts this viewpoint” (p. 88).
The Tribunal continued that “most of the prohibitions of both the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions, considered in substance, are clearly an expression of the accepted 
views of civilised nations and binding (...) These concern the treatment of prisoners 
of war (...)” − p. 89. 
Subsequently, while enumerating which provisions (or their parts) should 
be cited “in this category”, the Tribunal pointed, among others, to Article 4 of 
the Hague Rules of Land Warfare (“Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile 
Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them. They must be 
humanely treated...”) and Article 2 of the Geneva Convention (“They [prisoners of 
war] must at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of 
violence, insults, and public curiosity ...”) − pp. 89-91.
1.11. A similar position to that of the Nuremberg International Military Tribu-
nal was adopted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 
Tribunal) when it stated that “the [IV Hague] Convention remains good evidence of 
the customary law of nations.”5
2  Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nurem-
berg 1947, vol. XXII, p. 475.
3  Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XII.
4  Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, London 1949, vol. X, p. 133.
5  “Digest of Public International Law Cases” 1948, vol. 15, p. 366.
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1.12. The legal characterisation under international law of the Hague Regulations, 
as applied at the post-war trials, was followed by this Court in the seminal Grand 
Chamber judgement of Kononov v. Latvia (appl. no. 26376/04, judg. of 17 May 
2010). The Court stated that the Hague Regulations were, although not ratiﬁ ed 
by the Soviet Union or Latvia, binding on them, as these rules “were solidly part of 
international law by 1939” (para. 200).
1.13. In the course of the Nuremberg Trial the Soviet prosecutors sought to charge 
the German forces with the Katyń massacre. The Katyń massacre was mentioned 
in the indictment as an instance of a war crime:
“Indictment: Count Three − War Crimes
(Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (b))
(...)
(C) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND OF OTH-
ER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES WITH WHOM 
GERMANY WAS AT WAR, AND OF PERSONS ON THE HIGH SEAS
(...)
In September 1941, 11,000 Polish oﬃ  cers who were prisoners of war were killed in the 
Katyn Forest near Smolensk.”6 
During the proceedings before the International Military Tribunal General 
R.A. Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor for the USSR, referred to the Katyń massacre as 
“the mass shooting of Polish oﬃ  cers by the Fascist criminals in Katyn Forest”, “crimi-
nal activity”7, “mass shooting of Poles”, “a link in the chain of many bestial crimes 
perpetrated by the Hitlerites”,8 “atrocities at Katyn”.9
Eventually, the charge related to the Katyń massacre, as brought against the 
Germans accused at Nuremberg, was dismissed by US and British judges for lack 
of evidence.
6  Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nurem-
berg 1947, vol. I, pp. 42-54.
7  Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nurem-
berg 1948, vol. XV, p. 289. In full: “the Soviet Prosecution have several times expressed their view 
respecting the application of Defense Counsel to call witnesses with regard to the mass shooting of 
Polish ofﬁ cers by the Fascist criminals in Katyn Forest. Our position is that this episode of criminal 
activity on the part of the Hitlerites has been fully established by the evidence presented by the 
Soviet Prosecution”.
8  Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nurem-
berg 1948, vol. XV, p. 290. 
9  Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nurem-
berg 1947, vol. IX, p. 28.
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1.14. The classiﬁ cation of the Katyń massacre as a war crime, as made by the Nu-
remberg Tribunal, must be treated in objective terms and is not dependent upon 
who actually committed the atrocity.
1.15. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal deﬁ nes war crimes in 
its Article 6 (b) as, among others, acts consisting in murder or ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war. 
1.16. Examining evidence on charges related to war crimes committed against 
prisoners of war, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg pointed to the 
executions of: 
• members of Allied “commando” units who, following a directive issued 
on 18 October 1942 by Adolf Hitler, were to be “slaughtered to the last 
man”, even if they attempted to surrender;
• escaped oﬃ  cers and non-commissioned-oﬃ  cers who, upon recapture, 
were to be sent, as ordered by the so-called “Bullet decree” issued in 
March 1944, to the Mauthausen camp to be shot there;
• 50 oﬃ  cers of the British Royal Force, who escaped from the POW camp 
at Sagan, but on recapture were shot on the direct orders of Adolf Hitler;
• “Red commissars” of the Soviet Army, as they were considered by the 
German forces as not beneﬁ ting from the status of prisoners of war;
• those Soviet prisoners of war who, following the Gestapo order of 17 July 
1941, were identiﬁ ed as important functionaries of the Soviet State, Jews, 
political agitators and fanatical communists.10 
1.17. War crimes that were committed against prisoners of war and consisted in 
their executions or killing were also the subject matter of other post-war trials. 
Besides the main Nuremberg trial, this kind of war crimes occurred in particlar in 
the the German High Command Trial (Case of Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Oth-
ers),11 before the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (30 December 
1947−28 October 1948). 
The charges against the accused referred to:
• “Commando” order, and the following war crimes:
a) on or about 7 July 1944 near Poitiers in France, troops of the LXXX 
Corps of the 18th Army, under Army Group G, executed 1 American 
prisoner of war and 30 British prisoners of war;
10  Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nurem-
berg 1947, vol. XXII, pp. 471-475.
11  Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XII.
POLISH PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
415
b) on or about 22 May 1944 on the island of Alimnia near Greece an 
English soldier and a Greek sailor were executed; 
c) on or about 16 April1944 a British prisoner of war was turned over by 
Stalag 7a to the SD for execution;
d) on or about 10 December 1942· in or near Bordeaux, France, members 
of the German naval forces executed 2 uniformed British soldiers;
e) on or about 20 November 1942 near Stavanger, Norway, members of 
the German armed forces executed 17 uniformed British soldiers;
f) on or about 22 March 1944 near La Spezia, Italy, members’ of the Ger-
man armed forces executed 15 uniformed US soldiers;
g) in January 1945 in the Mauthausen Concentration Camp, Austria, 
from 12 to 15 American prisoners of war, comprising an American 
military mission, were executed. 
• Eastern Front, and the following war crimes:
a) on or about 28 July 1941 in the sector of Zwiahel in the USSR troops 
within the rear area of Army Group South, killed 73 surrendered So-
viet prisoners of war as “guerrillas”;
b) on or about 25 August 1941, in the USSR, troops of the 18th Army 
under Army Group North killed 35 wounded prisoners of war;
c) on or about 9 September 1941 in Djedkowow in the USSR, troops of 
Panzer Group 3 killed 4 Soviet prisoners of war;
d) on or about 13 September 1941, troops of the 213th Security Division 
of the Rear Area Army Group South, executed 13 escaped and recap-
tured Soviet prisoners of war; 
e) on or about 15 October 1941 in the area of the 24th Infantry Division, 
more than 1,000 Soviet prisoners of war were shot to death because 
they were unable to march, or died from exhaustion;
f) on 16 October 1941 in Nikolayev, troops of the 11th Army delivered 
75 Jewish prisoners of war to the SD for execution;
g) on or about 22 October 1941, 20 Soviet prisoners of war were exe-
cuted at concentration camp “Gross Rosen”; on or about 15 October 
1941, 21 Soviet prisoners of war were executed at Dachau; on or about 
22 October 1941, 40 Soviet prisoners of war were executed at Dachau; 
on or about 8 November 1941, 99 Soviet prisoners, of war were ex-
ecuted at Dachau; on or about 12 November 1941, 135 Soviet prison-
ers of war were executed at Dachau; between 1 September 1941 and 
23 January 1942, 1,082 Soviet prisoners of war were selected by the 
Gestapo at Regensburg for execution and executed;
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h) in the month of September 1942 in the rear area of the 2nd Army, 
384 prisoners of war died or were shot and 42 others were turned over 
to the SD for execution;
i) in the period from 1 January 1942 to 6 March 1942 in the rear area of 
the 11th Army, 2,366 prisoners of war were killed or died of exhaus-
tion, neglect and disease, and 317 prisoners of war were turned over 
to the SD for execution;
j) from 14 January 1942 to 29 September 1942 in the rear area of Army 
Group North, 200 captured Soviet prisoners of war were executed;
k) in July 1943 in the rear area of the 4th Panzer Army, 24 prisoners of 
war were turned over to the SD for execution, and in August 1943,
39 prisoners of war were turned over to the SD for execution;
l) in January 1945 a French prisoner of war, the General Mesney, then 
under the control of the German Prisoner of War Administration, was 
murdered, and thereafter false reports of the cause and nature of his 
death were issued.
• The “Commissar” Order: 
a) from 21 June 1941 to about 8 July 1941, troops of the XXXXI Corps 
in Panzer Group 4 under Army Group North killed 97 “political com-
missars”;
b) from 21 June 1941 to about 19 July 1941, troops of Panzer Group 4, 
under Army Group North, killed 172 “political commissars”;
c) from 21 June 1941 to about 1 August 1941, troops of Panzer Group 3 
killed 170 “political commissars”;
d) on or about 1 October 1941, troops of the rear area of the 11th Army, 
killed 1 “political commissar”;
e) on or about 4 October 1941, troops of the 454th Security Division, of 
the Rear Area of Army Group South, killed 1 “political commissar”;
f) from about 18 October 1941 to 26 October 1941, in the operational 
area of the XXVIII Corps in the USSR, troops of the 18th Army, under 
Army Group North, killed 17 “political commissars”;
g) on 29 May: 1942, in the operational area of the XXXXIV Corps. troops 
of the 17th Army, killed 2 “political commissars”.
1.18. The other most important post-war cases on war crimes were:
• The case of Anton Dostler, adjudicated by the United States Military 
Commission (Rome, 8-12 October 1945). Dostler was accused of having 
ordered the shooting of ﬁ fteen American prisoners of war. Two oﬃ  cers 
and 13 men of a special reconnaissance battalion disembarked from some 
United States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast about 250 miles 
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behind the front-line. The 15 members of the United States Army were 
on a military mission, which was to demolish a railroad tunnel. After hav-
ing been captured and interrogated, they were summarily executed on an 
order of General Dostler (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. I, 
p. 22 and subseq.).
• The Almelo Trial (trial of Otto Sandrock and three others), before British 
Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals (held at the Court House, 
Almelo, Holland, 24-26 November 1945). The four accused individuals 
were charged with committing a war crime that consisted in killing of 
a British prisoner of war who was living in hiding (Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals, vol. I, p. 35 and subseq.).
• The Jaluit Atoll Case (trial of Rear-Admiral Nisuke Masuda and four 
others of the Imperial Japanese Navy), before the United States Military 
Commission (United States−Naval Air Base, Kwajalein Island, Kwajalein 
Atoll, Marshall Islands, 7-13 December 1945). Killing of three America 
unarmed airmen who were captured and held in custody (Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals, vol. I, p. 71 and subseq.).
• The Dreierwalde Case (trial of Karl Amberger), before British Military 
Court (Wuppertal, 11-14 March 1946). Shooting ﬁ ve allied prisoners of 
war, allegedly on their attempts to escape, when on the way, under a con-
voy, to a railway station (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. I, 
p. 81 and subseq.).
• The Essen Lynching Case (trial of Erich Heyer and six others, before Bri-
tish Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals (Essen, 18-19 and 21-22 
December 1945). Lynching by civilians of three airmen when they were 
escorted to an interrogation centre. Erich Heyer, who was the command-
ing oﬃ  cer, gave order to the escort not to interfere if civilians should mo-
lest the prisoners of war (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. I, 
p. 88 and subseq.). 
• Trial of Albert Bury and Wilhelm Hafner, before the United States Mili-
tary Commission (Freising, Germany, 15 July 1945). Killing of an Ameri-
can airman (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. III, p. 62 and 
subseq.).
• The case of Aoki Toshio, by British Military Court (Singapore, 11 Febru-
ary 1946). Toshio was charged with “committing a war crime in that he at 
Sonkurai Camp in the month of November 1943 in violation of the laws 
and usages of war by forcing some three hundred British prisoners of war 
at that time in his custody the majority of whom were sick and injured to 
enter a train containing no suﬃ  cient or suitable accommodation and by 
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allowing Korean soldiers under his command to beat, kick and otherwise 
maltreat the prisoners, causing the death of seven of the prisoners and 
further injured the health of the remainder.” 
• The trial of Major Karl Rauer and six others before British Military Court 
(Wuppertal, Germany, 18 February 1946). Rauer and co-accused were 
charged with committing war crimes in that they were “concerned in” 
the killing, contrary to the laws and usages of war, of Allied prisoners 
of war on one or more of three occasions on 22, 24 and 25 March, 1945 
(Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, p. 113 and subseq.).
• The trial of Karl Buck and ten others before British Military Court (Wup-
pertal, Germany, 6-10 May 1946) The accused were charged with com-
mitting a war crime, in that they, at Rotenfels Security Camp, Gaggenau, 
Germany, on 25 November, 1944, in violation of the laws and usages of 
war, were concerned in the killing of six British prisoners of war, all of 
No. 2 Special Air Service Regiment, four American prisoners of war, and 
four French Nationals (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. V, 
p. 39 and subseq.)
• The trial of Karl Adam Golkel and thirteen others before British Mili-
tary Court (Wuppertal, Germany, 15-21 May 1946). The accused were 
charged with committing a war crime in that they at La Grande Fosse, 
France, on 15 October 1944, in violation of the laws and usages of war, 
were concerned in the killing of eight named members of No. 2 Special 
Air Service Regiment, a British unit, when prisoners of war (Law Reports 
of Trials of War Criminals, vol. V, p. 45 and subseq.)
• The trial of Lieutenant General Harukei Isayama and seven others before 
the United States Military Commission (Shanghai, 1-25 July 1946). The 
accused were charged with committing a war crime in that they did each 
“at Taihoku, Formosa, wilfully, unlawfully and wrongfully, commit cruel, 
inhuman and brutal atrocities and other oﬀ ences against certain Ameri-
can prisoners of war, by permitting and participating in an illegal and 
false trial and unlawful killing of said prisoners of war, in violation of the 
laws and customs of war” (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. V, 
p. 60 and subseq.)
• The trial of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst Flesch, SS OBE Sturmbannführer, 
Oberregierungsrat before Frostating Lagmannsrett (November Decem-
ber1946) and the Supreme Court of Norway (February 1948). The ac-
cused was charged with having committed war crimes inter alia in that in 
August-September 1944, he gave orders for the hanging of 15 Russian 
prisoners of war and supervised himself the execution (Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals, vol. VI, p. 111 and subseq.)
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• The trial of Obersturmbannführer Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess before 
the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland (11-29 March 1947). The ac-
cused was the Commandant of the Auschwitz Camp. He was charged with 
committing a war crimes and crimes against humanity in that from 1 May 
1940 till the end of October 1943, as Commandant of the Auschwitz con-
centration camp set up by him, and thereafter from December 1943, till 
May 1945, as Head of the D.l. Department of the SS Central Economic 
and Administrative Oﬃ  ce, as well as in June, July and August 1944, as 
commander of the SS garrison at Auschwitz he inter alia acting either 
himself or through the subordinate camp personnel deliberately deprived 
of life about 12,000 Soviet prisoners of war (Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, vol. VII, p. 11 and subseq.)
• The trial of Karl Bauer, Ernst Schrameck and Herbert Falten, adjudicated 
by Permanent Military Tribunal (Dijon, 18 October 1945). The accused 
were charged with complicity in murder in that, by abusing authority and 
powers, they had provoked murder in reprisals of three soldiers of the 
F.F.I. captured as prisoners of war (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 
vol. VIII, p. 28 and subseq.).
• The Dachau concentration camp trial. The trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss 
and thirty nine others, adjudicated by General Military Government 
Court of The United States Zone (Dachau, 15 November-13 December 
1945). The accused were charged of cruelties and mistreatments includ-
ing killings, beatings and tortures, starvation, abuses and indignities of 
prisoners whom app. 10 per cent were prisoners of war. In spring 1942, 
6,000-8,000 Russian prisoners of war were killed. Around September 
1944, 90 Russian oﬃ  cers were hanged in the camp (Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals, vol. XI, p. 17 and subseq.).
• The trial of Generaloberst Nickolaus von Falkenhorst, adjudicated by Bri-
tish Military Court (Brunswick, 29 July – 2 August 1946). He was charged 
with 9 charges, among them that he was responsible as Commander-in-
Chief of Armed Forces, Norway, for the handing over by forces under his 
command, to the Security Service of, in total, 41 British prisoners of war 
of diﬀ erent ranks and 7 Norwegian prisoners of war, with the result that 
said prisoners were killed (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XI, 
p. 30 and subseq.).
• The Stalag Luft III Case. The trial of Max Wielen and 17 others, adju-
dicated by British Military Court (Hamburg, 1 July-3 September 1947). 
All the accused were charged with committing a war crime in that they 
were concerned in the killing in violation of the laws and usages of war 
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of prisoners of war who had escaped from Stalag Luft III (Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals, vol. XI, p. 43 and subseq.).
• The trial of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, adjudicated by Australian 
Military Court (Rabaul, 28 May-2 June 1947). The accused was charged 
with failing to discharge his duty as a commander to control the members 
of his command whereby certain of members of his command murdered 
a number of prisoners of war (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 
vol. XI, p. 69 and subseq.).
• The trial of Johannes Oenning and Emil Nix, adjudicated by British Mili-
tary Court (Borken, Germany, 21-22 December 1945). Oenning and Nix 
were accused of killing of a named Royal Air Force Oﬃ  cer, a prisoner of 
war (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XI, p. 87 and subseq.).
• The trial of Hans Renoth and three others, adjudicated by British Mili-
tary Court (Elten, Germany, 8-10 January 1946). All the accused were 
charged with and found guilty of killing of an unknown Allied airman, 
a prisoner of war (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XI, p. 89 
and subseq.).
• The trial of Willi Mackensen, adjudicated by British Military Court 
(Hannover, 28 January 1946). He was accused of, that as a result of his 
ill-treatment of prisoners of war, at least 30 prisoners of war died (Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XI, p. 94 and subseq.).
• The trial of Eberhard Schoengrath and six others, adjudicated by Brit-
ish Military Court (Burgsteinfurt, Germany, 7-11 February 1946). They 
were charged with the killing of an unknown Allied airman, a prisoner of 
war (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XI, p. 96 and subseq.).
• The trial of Ulrich Greifelt and others, adjudicated by United States Mili-
tary Tribunal (Nuremberg, 10 October 1947 – 10 March 1948). There 
were three connected trials. 
a) In the trial of Hans Seibold and two others (5-7 March 1947) the 
defendants were implicated in the killing of a member of the United 
States Army, who was surrendered and unarmed prisoner of war in 
the custody of the then German Reich.
b) In the trial held from 10 January to 21 March 1947, there were 23 
accused with Jurgen Stroop at their head. They were implicated in the 
ill-treatment, including death, beatings, and torture, of members of 
armed forces then at war with the then German Reich, who were sur-
rendered and unarmed prisoners of war in the custody of the then 
Germany Reich (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XIII, p. 14 
and subseq.).
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• United States Military Commission at the Mariana Islands (2-15 August 
1946) tried and convicted Tachibana Yochio, a Lieutenant-General in the 
Japanese Army and 13 others, of murdering 8 prisoners of war. 
• Australian Military Court at Rabaul (2 April 1946) sentenced Tomiyasu 
Tisato, a First Lieutenant in the Japanese Army, after ﬁ nding him guilty of 
the murder of an unknown Indian prisoner of war (Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals, vol. XIII, p. 164 and subseq.).
• The trial of Takashi Sakai, adjudicated by Chinese War Crimes Military 
Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defence (Nanking, 29 August 1946). 
On 17 and 18 December 1941, in Hongkong, thirty prisoners of war were 
massacred and twenty four more prisoners were killed at West Point For-
tress. Between 24th and 26th December 1941, sixty to seventy wound-
ed prisoners of war were killed (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 
vol. XIV, p. 15 and subseq.).
1.19. A comparison of the post-war trials on executions/killings of prisoners of 
war with the Katyń massacre reveals a certain striking and diﬀ ering element. Post-
war trials dealt with crimes, however heinous they were, which were either com-
mitted in a direct post-combat context or concerned certain groups of prisoners of 
war which were considered, for diﬀ erent reasons, as stripped of the beneﬁ t of pris-
oner-of-war status (members of “commando” units or military missions, escaped 
POWs, “political commissars”, “terror ﬂ yers”). Such particular small groups of 
military personnel were selected to be killed, in violation of international humani-
tarian law, from the ranks of all prisoners of war. By contrast, in the case of the 
Katyń massacre almost all prisoners of war were designated to be killed (14,552) 
with only a tiny group of 395 individuals chosen to survive. In the context of the 
Second World War this very feature makes the Katyń massacre unique and excep-
tional as a war crime perpetrated against prisoners of war.
1.20. As a crime of international law, the Katyń massacre was imprescriptible at 
the time of its commission. The applicants’ counsels rely in this respect on the 
Court’s considerations in Kononov v. Latvia. First, the Court declared that in or-
der to adequately qualify under law an act committed in 1944 (and to determine 
the ensuing legal consequences) the national prosecution authorities and courts 
were required to make reference to relevant international law, not only as regards 
the deﬁ nition of the act, but also as regards the determination of any applicable 
limitation period (para. 230). Then the Court held that in 1944 no limitation 
period was ﬁ xed by international law as regards the prosecution of war crimes, and 
neither did developments in international law since 1944 impose any limitation 
period with respect to war crimes (paras. 231-232)
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1.21. It should be mentioned that the Katyń massacre was classiﬁ ed as having the 
features jointly of war crime, crime against humanity and genocide by the Rus-
sian Commission of Experts (in its report of 2 August 1993 prepared within the 
framework of investigation no. 159) and by the Polish Institute of National Re-
membrance (decision of 30 November 2004 to commence investigation into the 
Katyń crime). Furthermore, political institutions and bodies in their resolutions 
called the Katyń massacre “a war crime having the character of genocide”: resolu-
tion of Polish Parliament of 23 September 2009 and statement of the Delegation 
to the EU−Russia Parliamentary Co-operation Committee, European Parliament, 
dated 10 May 2010.
Conclusion: The Katyń massacre constituted a violation of the prohibi-
tions contained in the IV Hague Convention of 1907 and Geneva Con-
vention of 1929. These prohibitions were recognised, as evidenced by 
post-war trials, as corresponding by 1939 to the relevant universally 
binding customary rules of humanitarian law. The Katyń massacre was 
also classiﬁ ed as a war crime in the indictment to the Nuremberg trial 
of the main war criminals before the International Military Tribunal. 
This legal qualiﬁ cation was never questioned, but fully endorsed at the 
Nuremberg trial by representatives of the Soviet Union, which was the 
legal predecessor of the Russian Federation. Furthermore the abundant 
case law from the post-war trials of war criminals demonstrates convinc-
ingly and unequivocally that executions of prisoners of war constituted 
and were treated as war crimes by the international community. Lastly, 
the Katyń massacre as a crime of international law was imprescriptible 
at the time of its commission, as it is today.
(ii) If characterised as a “war crime” contrary to the underlying values of the Con-
vention, was the need to ensure the real and eﬀ ective protection of those values 
suﬃ  cient for the procedural obligations imposed by Article 2 to come into eﬀ ect 
(see Šilih, § 163)?
1.22. To date, the Court has on several occasions made reference to “the underly-
ing values of the Convention” as a normatively relevant construct. 
1.23. Usually, the construct of the underlying values of the Convention was used 
in its negative function of preventing individuals from making use of the Con-
vention rights and freedoms for purposes or in a way contrary to the Convention 
axiology.
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1.24. In Lehideux and Isorni v. France [GC] the Court held that “[t]here is no doubt 
that, like any other remark directed against the Convention’s underlying values (...) the 
justiﬁ cation of a pro-Nazi policy could not be allowed to enjoy the protection aﬀ orded 
under Article 10” (appl. no. 24662/94, judg. of 23 September 1998, RJD 1998-VII, 
§ 53). In this judgement the Court referred to the case of Jersild v. Denmark [GC], 
where insulting racially motivated speech was deemed not to enjoy the protection 
of the Convention (appl. no. 15890/89, judg. of 23 September 1994, Series A no. 
298, § 35; in this sense also e.g. Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, appl. 
nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78, dec. of 11 October 1979, DR 18, p. 187; and Kühnen 
v. Germany, appl. no. 12194/86, dec. of 12 May 1988 DR 56, p. 205).
In the subsequent decision of Garaudy v. France the Court was confronted 
with a revisionist book that denied the reality of the Holocaust (appl. no. 65831/01, 
dec. of 24 June 2003, ECHR 2003-IX). The Court declared that “[d]enying crimes 
against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of racial defamation of Jews 
and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical 
fact undermines the values on which the ﬁ ght against racism and anti-Semitism are 
based and constitutes a serious threat to public order. Such acts are incompatible with 
democracy and human rights because they infringe the rights of others. (...) The Court 
considers that the main content and general tenor of the applicant’s book, and thus its 
aim, are markedly revisionist and therefore run counter to the fundamental values of 
the Convention, as expressed in its Preamble, namely justice and peace.” 
This line of reasoning was repeated in Witzch v. Germany, where statements 
denying Hitler’s and the National Socialists’ responsibility in the extermination 
of the Jews were described as showing “disdain towards the victims of the Holo-
caust” and running “counter to the text and the spirit of the Convention” (appl. no. 
7485/03, dec. of 13 December 2005).
In Orban and Others v. France the Court noted that “statements pursuing the 
unequivocal aim of justifying war crimes such as torture or summary executions (...) 
amounted to deﬂ ecting Article 10 from its real purpose“ (appl. no. 20985/05, judg. 
of 15 January 2005, § 35).12
1.25. If speech denying the Holocaust or crimes against humanity or justifying 
war crimes has been rightly declared by the Court as contravening the underlying 
values of the Convention, then all the more the heinous acts themselves, the real-
ity of which is denied or committing of which is justiﬁ ed, must be deemed contrary 
to the core values of the Convention.
12  Original version: “des propos ayant sans équivoque pour but de justiﬁ er des crimes 
de guerre tels que la torture ou des exécutions sommaires sont pareillement caractéristiques d’un 
détournement de l’article 10 de sa vocation.”
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1.26. In Šilih v. Slovenia, para. 163, the construct of the underlying values of the 
Convention was evoked in its positive function, i.e. as a justiﬁ cation for the State’s 
obligation to conduct an eﬀ ective investigation under Article 2 when a particular 
case of death (resp. killing) preceded the ratiﬁ cation of the Convention by the 
respondent State. The applicants’ counsels are of the opinion, as they have already 
submitted to the Court in their observations, that the Court’s temporal compe-
tence should be established, ﬁ rst of all, by reference to the need to ensure the real 
and eﬀ ective protection of the underlying values of the Convention.
1.27. For an investigation to be eﬀ ective as required by Article 2, it must include 
all reasonable and available measures capable of establishing the circumstances of 
a given tragic event and leading to the identiﬁ cation of the perpetrators and those 
who might be involved in it, as well as bringing them to justice. 
1.28. Three principal arguments can be formulated in the case of the Katyń massa-
cre, which was a mass-scale crime of international law, contrary to the underlying 
values of the Convention, to justify the fulﬁ lment of the procedural obligations 
imposed by Article 2 being needed to ensure the real and eﬀ ective protection of 
the Convention founding values. 
1.29. Firstly, in the preamble to the Convention it was declared that the Mem-
ber States of the Council of Europe and of the Convention build a community 
based on “the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” State Parties of the Convention depend, as political democracies, on 
“observance of the human rights”, which are “the foundation of justice and peace”.
Crimes of international law, in particular those consisting in murders, are 
by deﬁ nition contrary to the above-mentioned aims of the Council of Europe and 
the Convention. They constitute drastic violations of human rights, undermining 
the very sense of justice and peace. Therefore, since speech denying the reality 
of crimes of international law or justifying their being committed was declared 
by the Court to be an act of “disdain towards the victims” (decision Witzch v. Ger-
many), “a serious threat to public order” which is “incompatible with democracy and 
human rights” and running counter to “the fundamental values of the Convention, 
as expressed in its Preamble, namely justice and peace” (decision Garaudy v. France), 
the same rationale should apply, mutatis mutandis, in the context of the lack of an 
eﬃ  cient investigation into killings that are crimes of international law.
Furthermore, the lack of an eﬃ  cient investigation into killings that are 
crimes of international law should also be qualiﬁ ed as act of disdain towards 
victims and their living relatives, sometimes even tantamount to a denial of the 
atrocities or a justiﬁ cation of their being committed (if the State authorities ig-
nore or disregard established historical facts).
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1.30. It seems unnecessary to deﬁ ne in abstract terms with respect to which 
categories of murders as crimes under international law the very character of 
a given act would require an eﬀ ective investigation to be conducted in order to en-
sure the real and eﬀ ective protection of Convention values. Murderous crimes of 
international law can be committed by “private individuals” or “occasionally” by 
State functionaries, but sometimes they are also perpetrated as part of a State poli-
cy, deliberately planned and realised on the orders of the highest State authorities. 
It is with regard to this ﬁ nal category of international crimes that the interrelation-
ship between the procedural obligation of eﬀ ective investigation and the real and 
eﬀ ective protection of the Convention values becomes pertinent.
In other words, if we were to reconstruct a continuum of crimes of interna-
tional law it would starts with crimes committed by private individuals, followed 
by crimes “occasionally” committed by State functionaries, and on the extreme 
edge of this continuum would be located crimes that involve States in the strong-
est possible way: these are mass-scale crimes orchestrated and carried out on the 
orders of the highest State authorities (such as the Holocaust and the Katyń mas-
sacre). If the humanitarian rule from Šilih is to have any normative sense and any 
practical eﬀ ect, and to be alive at all, it must apply at least to the crimes located in 
and around the extreme edge of the continuum.
1.31. Secondly, the Council of Europe and the Convention came into being as 
democratic political and legal alternatives to the two totalitarian regimes, Nazism 
and Stalinism, which were responsible for horriﬁ c mass-scale violations of human 
dignity. The vision of the founders of the Council of Europe and the Convention 
was directed towards a system that clearly deﬁ nes what is just and what unjust. 
This intention clearly transpires from the Travaux préparatoires to the Convention. 
To give only one example: 
“while I was in the Gestapo prisons, while one of my brothers was at Dachau 
and one of my brothers-in-law was dying at Mauthausen, my father (...) was 
interned at Buchenwand. He told me that on the monumental gate of the camp 
was this outrageous inscription: ‘Just or unjust, the Fatherland”.
I think that from our First Session we can unanimously proclaim that in Europe 
there will henceforth only be just fatherlands.
I think we can now unanimously confront ‘reasons of State’ with the only sover-
eignty worth dying for, worthy in all circumstances of being defended, respected 
and safeguarded – the sovereignty of justice and law.” (Collected edition of the 
“Travaux préparatoires” of the European Convention on Human Rights, The 
Hague 1975-1985, vol. I, pp. 48-49).
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1.32. The Katyń massacre was committed by a totalitarian regime whose aims and 
values radically and drastically contradicted those of the Convention. It therefore 
becomes mandatory, if the Convention values are to be protected in the real and 
eﬀ ective manner, that the political successors of the totalitarian States, currently 
Contracting Parties to the Convention, should conduct an eﬀ ective investigation 
into the totalitarian crimes. Whenever other rationes for the Court’s competence 
are established, the temporal jurisdiction of the Court may result from the need to 
ensure the real and eﬀ ective protection of the Convention values.
Had democratic Germany not conducted an eﬀ ective investigation into 
the Holocaust atrocities, the Court would have been competent, relying on “the 
humanitarian clause” from the Šilih judgement, to determine whether this led to 
a violation of the procedural obligation under Article 2. The applicants’ counsels 
are mindful of the diﬀ erences between the Holocaust and the Katyń massacre, but 
they consider that in the cases of mass-scale crimes perpetrated by the two totali-
tarian regimes the rationale of the real and eﬀ ective protection of the Convention 
values come into play as a speciﬁ c factor for the determination of the Court’s 
competence ratione temporis. 
1.33. Thirdly, an eﬀ ective investigation into the Katyń massacre is a prerequisite 
for the rehabilitation of the murdered persons as victims of political repression. 
To date, those persons killed are considered, in legal terms, as sentenced and 
executed in conformity with Soviet legislation.
It is also worth noting the social consequences of the lack of eﬃ  cient inves-
tigation. The fact that the Katyń massacre was committed by the Soviet Union is 
broadly denied in Russia, even by members of the Russian Parliament. In a public 
opinion poll conducted in Russia in 2010 as many as 53 percent of the respond-
ents did not know who committed the Katyń massacre, 28 percent attributed it to 
the Germans and only 19 percent pointed to the Soviet Union. 
Another illustration of the indirect adverse consequences of the lack of ef-
ﬁ cient investigation is that some Russian towns continue today to bear the names 
of members of the Politburo of the Communist Party who on 5 March 1940 made 
the decision to shoot almost 22,000 Polish citizens. Among these towns is Kalin-
ingrad, capital of the region adjacent to the Polish-Russian border. 
1.34. Since, for several cumulatively applicable reasons, the eﬀ ective investigation 
into the Katyń massacre was necessary to ensure the real and eﬀ ective protection 
of the Convention values, the applicants’ counsels respectfully invite the Court 
to make use of Article 46 of the Convention. In exceptional cases – as this case 
is exceptional – the Court indicated the type of measure that might, and some-
times should, be taken in order to put an end to the situation it found to exist 
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(e.g. Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, appl. no. 27065/05, judg. of 2 December 2010). 
The applicants’ counsels would wish to rely in particular on the judgement in 
the case of Association of “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (appl. nos. 
33810/07 and 18817/08, judg. of 24 May 2011). In this judgement the Court 
declared that:
“l’État défendeur doit mettre un terme à la situation constatée en l’espčce, jugée 
par elle contraire à la Convention, relevant du droit des nombreuses person-
nes touchées, comme les requérants individuels, à une enquęte eﬀ ective, qui ne 
s’achève pas par l’eﬀ et de la prescription de la responsabilité pénale, compte tenu 
également de l’importance pour la société roumaine de savoir la vérité sur les 
événements de décembre 1989. L’État défendeur doit donc oﬀ rir un redressement 
approprié aﬁ n de respecter les exigences de l’article 46 de la Convention, en ten-
ant compte des principes énoncés par la jurisprudence de la Cour” (§ 194).
[“The respondent State is to end the situation found in this case, considered 
by the Court as contrary to the Convention and concerning the rights of many 
persons aﬀ ected, as individual applicants, to an eﬀ ective investigation, which 
does not end as a result of prescription of criminal responsibility, also taking 
into account the importance for Romanian society of knowing the truth about 
the events of December 1989. The respondent State must provide an appropriate 
remedy to meet the requirements of Article 46 of the Convention, taking into 
account the principles expressed in the case law of the Court.”]
1.35. In the background of the Romanian case were the tragic events that preceded 
the fall of the Ceausescu regime. The Court held that the eﬀ ective investigation of 
the events was necessary because of two principal reasons. Firstly, the persons killed 
were “many”, and it meant several hundred. Secondly, the Court stressed the inter-
est of Romanian society in knowing the truth about the events. This rationale ap-
plies all the more to the Katyń massacre, which was an imprescriptible crime under 
international law and in which 21,857 persons were murdered.
Conclusion: the humanitarian clause from the Šilih judgement justiﬁ es, 
for three reasons cumulatively present in the instant case, that the pro-
cedural obligations under Article 2 come into eﬀ ect in order to ensure 
the real and eﬀ ective protection of the Convention values. Firstly, the 
Katyń massacre was a mass-scale crime of international law organised 
and perpetrated on the orders of the highest authorities of the State, 
whose legal successor is a party to the Convention. Secondly, that crime 
was committed by a totalitarian regime in the furtherance of aims drasti-
cally contrary to the very foundations of the Council of Europe and the 
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Convention. Thirdly, an eﬀ ective investigation is indispensible to elimi-
nate the serious legal and societal adverse consequences of the lack of 
such an investigation. Additionally, the applicants’ counsels respectfully 
invite the Court to make use of Article 46 of the Convention.
(b) In the alternative, are there any other elements of the Court’s case-law capable of 
establishing its temporal jurisdiction in the present case?
1.36. As the applicants’ counsels have already argued in their former observa-
tions submitted on 29 May 2010, the Court will also have the competence ratione 
temporis to hear the case as far as “the proportion rule” from the Šilih judgement 
is concerned. 
1.37. Firstly, a signiﬁ cant part of the procedural steps in the Katyń criminal 
proceedings must have taken place after 5 May 1998, as the facts established 
before and after that date diﬀ er profoundly. At earlier stages of the Russian Katyń 
investigation the execution of Polish POWs by NKVD squads was not doubted, 
whereas the relevant Russian institutions later repeated that the fate of those 
prisoners was unknown. 
1.38. On 21 April 1998 the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce of the Russian 
Federation conﬁ rmed in its written answer to Mrs. Ojcumiła Wołk and Witomiła 
Wołk-Jezierska that Wincenty Wołk, son of Wacław, born 12 May 1909, had been 
kept as a POW in the special NKVD camp at Kozelsk, and had been shot dead 
along with others in spring 1940. However, in its responses to further requests 
ﬁ led in 2006 and 2008 by Mrs. Witomiła Wołk-Jezierska, the Chief Military 
Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce stated that the whereabouts of Wincenty Wołk remained un-
known. This position was then upheld by the Russian courts.
1.39. Therefore, there was a dramatic change in the investigation. If that change 
is to be presumed reasonable and justiﬁ ed it must have been accompanied by sig-
niﬁ cant investigation activities and backed up by a solid evidentiary material. Yet, 
very puzzlingly, the Respondent Party alleges that only “an insigniﬁ cant number 
of investigation activities, carried out at the end of the 1990s and after the year 
2000, did not lead to any considerable advance and change in the investigation” 
(para. 32 of the Memorandum).
1.40. Secondly, the crucial decisions to discontinue the investigation and to 
classify the materials from the investigation were made only in September and 
December 2004 respectively. 
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1.41. Lastly, it must be stressed that due to the secrecy clause still imposed on 
a signiﬁ cant part of the Russian Katyń investigation ﬁ les it is impossible to deter-
mine precisely how many and which legal steps took place before and after the 
“critical date”.
1.42. After the submission of the observations of 29 May 2010, the “proportion 
rule” from the Šilih judgement was applied in the following cases concerning deaths 
or killings that occurred before the “critical date”: Lăpuşan and Others v. Roma-
nia, appl. nos. 29007/06, 30552/06, 31323/06, 31920/06, 34485/06, 38960/06, 
38996/06, 39027/06 and 39067/06, judg. of 8 March 2011; Association of “21 De-
cember 1989” and Others v. Romania, appl. nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, judg. 
of 24 May 2011; Jularić v. Croatia, appl. no. 20106/06, judg. of 20 January 2011; 
Lyobov Eﬁ mesto v. Ukraine, appl. no. 75726/01, judg. of 25 November 2010; Palić 
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, appl. no. 4704/04, judg. of 15 February 2011. To date, 
the proportion rule has been unanimously applied in 11 judgements.
Conclusion: The applicants’ counsels consider that in the present case 
the Court has temporal jurisdiction established both by the humanitar-
ian rule and the proportion rule. However, they ask the Court to hold that 
compliance with the procedural limb of Article 2 is required by the need 
to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Conven-
tion are protected in the real and eﬀ ective manner. Moreover, the appli-
cants’ counsels respectfully invite the Court to make use of Article 46 of 
the Convention.
2. Assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to examine the case from the standpoint of 
the procedural obligation under Article 2, did the Russian State discharge its duty 
to carry out an eﬀ ective investigation?
 (a) In particular, was the applicants’ right to participate eﬀ ectively in the investiga-
tion adequately secured?
 (b) In rendering the decision on classiﬁ cation of the ﬁ le materials, was due weight 
given to the public interest in uncovering the crimes of the totalitarian past and 
the applicants’ private interest in discovering the fate of their relatives?
2.1. Article 2 requires States to conduct an eﬀ ective investigation in all cases of 
violent death or allegations that this may have occurred. This duty consists in tak-
ing all reasonable steps capable of establishing the circumstances of the death in 
question, identifying those who were responsible for it and bringing the perpetra-
tors to justice. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. 
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The investigation must be transparent to the public, but especially to close 
relatives of the victim. In all cases, the next-of-kin of the victim must be involved 
in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate in-
terests (e.g. Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, appl. no. 24746/94, judg. of. 
4 May 2001, § 109). Therefore the Court found violations of Article 2, e.g. when 
the family of the victim had no access to the investigation and court documents 
(Ögur v. Turkey [GC], appl. no. 21954/93, judg. of 20 May 1999, ECHR 1999-III, 
§ 92) and when the father of the victim was not informed of the decisions not to 
prosecute (Güleç v. Turkey, appl. no. 21593/93, judg. of 27 July 1998, Reports 
1998-IV, § 92).
The obligation to carry out an eﬀ ective investigation becomes especially per-
tinent when State functionaries are or may be implicated in the death (relevant 
Court’s case law referred to in para. 65 of the submissions of 29 May 2010). 
2.2. Russian investigation no. 159 does not meet the basic requirements of Article 2.
In the proceedings it has not been established whether in 1940 there were any 
executions of Polish citizens. Responding to the questions formulated by the Court 
in the document communicating the application, the Russian government stated 
that, of those who had been detained in the Ostashkov, Starobelsk and Kozelsk 
camps, 1,803 had “perished”, whereas the fate of the others was not known. Only 
22 persons were identiﬁ ed during the 1991 exhumation works, none of whom 
was a relative of the applicants. 
2.3. The Russian authorities did not provide any explanation as to the diﬀ erence 
between the number of persons killed in Shelepin’s note (21,857) and the much 
lower number of those called “perished” persons (1,803).
2.4. Actually, however, the Russian authorities have not provided any single name 
of the persons murdered. Illustrative of the Russian authorities’ approach is the 
case of the two persons who were among the 22 bodies identiﬁ ed during the exca-
vation work at Mednoye in 1991. These were Mr. Lucjan Rajchert and Mr. Wacław 
Słabolepszy. In 2006 the Memorial Association lodged an application for rehabili-
tation of the 16 POWs held in the special NKVD camps, among them Mr. Luc-
jan Rajchert and Mr. Wacław Słabolepszy. Despite the identiﬁ cation of these two 
POWs the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce rejected the rehabilitation request. 
This decision was conﬁ rmed by Khamovniki Circuit Court. When confronted 
with the results of the Russian exhumation, Judge Igor Kananovitch stated at 
a court hearing that a bullet hole in the skull proved only that a ﬁ rearm had been 
used against a certain person, but not that this person had been shot dead by State 
functionaries and, all the more, that he was a victim of political repression (the 
judgements of Khamovniki Circuit Court were attached to the submissions of ap-
plicants’ counsels of 12 October 2010).
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2.5. In its submissions to the Court the Russian Government stated that the Russian 
authorities had not in any way been obliged to institute and carry out any inves-
tigation into the Katyń massacre. This position may justify why, at a certain point, 
when the authorities started to consider, for whatever reasons, the investigation as 
“mistakenly” initiated, the investigation was no longer conducted properly. It must 
be stressed, however, that during the ﬁ rst period the investigation was carried out 
with the full co-operation of Polish specialists and the prosecutor in charge of it 
intended to classify the Katyń massacre as a war crime, crime against humanity and 
genocide (motion of Anatoly Yablokov of 13 June 1994 and the legal opinion of the 
Russian Commission of Experts on the Katyń Case of 2 August 1993). 
2.6. As regards the evidence collected, the Russian authorities did not conduct 
full-scale excavations at all burial sites. Originally, however, the excavations were to 
be performed not to assess the number of victims, but only to conﬁ rm that Polish 
citizens had been buried in certain locations. In terms of the number of victims 
and their names, other evidence was considered pertinent and credible. When, 
however, the excavation works became crucial for determining the number of vic-
tims and their identities, they should have been carried out on a full scale with the 
aim of identiﬁ cation of the bodies. 
2.7. The applicants were not given the status of injured party in the investigation. 
As a result, they could not participate in the proceedings, present documents and 
evidence, or submit motions. Their participation became especially pertinent 
when the Russian authorities began to have doubts as to the number of victims 
and the fate of those whose names were on the NKVD dispatching lists. 
2.8. Deprivation of opportunities to participate in the investigation was particu-
larly detrimental to the applicants’ rights as the Russian authorities consistently 
assured that the investigation was coming to its end without anything suggesting 
a sudden and dramatic change in the conclusions of the proceedings.
2.9. Irrespective of whether the Russian authorities considered the applicants’ 
relatives as dead or disappeared, the applicants should have access to the case ﬁ le, 
as their own legal interests were involved in the proceedings, e.g. knowing the 
circumstances of the death (or disappearance) of their close relatives and the 
decision-making process that led to this death (or disappearance).
2.10. In view of the foregoing, investigation no. 159 may not be considered trans-
parent to the applicants. 
2.11. The requirement of transparency also applies to the public at large. This re-
quirement should be of particular importance in cases of serious human rights 
violations, especially those committed by totalitarian regimes in the furtherance 
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of aims contrary to values of the Council of Europe and the Convention. Investi-
gation no. 159 concerned a mass-scale crime of international law perpetrated by 
the Stalinist regime. There therefore existed, and continues to exist, an important 
public interest in terms of knowing what circumstances of the Katyń massacre 
have been established by the prosecutor’s oﬃ  ce. 
2.12. The Russian authorities rely on State security grounds as justiﬁ cation for the 
secrecy of the case ﬁ le. There are several reasons for which this argument may not 
be accepted. Firstly, in a democratic society the public interest in uncovering the 
mass-scale crimes of totalitarian regimes is so preponderant that hardly may any 
true and real interest of the State, which pretends to be democratic and follows 
democratic values, be invoked to justify the secrecy of the investigation ﬁ les. It is 
therefore unimaginable that, for example, the democratic Germany might claim 
security reasons for classifying ﬁ les concerning Nazi crimes. If a State of the Con-
vention relies on fundamental State interests in the context of crimes committed 
by its totalitarian predecessor it may be justly perceived as equal to suggesting 
the continuity between the regimes, and even as an act of approval of the atroci-
ties. Secondly, societies that lived under totalitarian regimes, if these societies are 
to transform themselves into democratic ones, need knowledge about the atroci-
ties of such regimes. This knowledge is part and parcel of civic and democratic 
education. Thirdly, the time factor must be taken into account. The applicants’ 
counsels are ready to accept that even in the case of crimes of international law 
State interests may exceptionally be invoked. Nevertheless such exceptions must 
be very rigorously and narrowly interpreted, and may justify the classiﬁ cation of 
only particular sensitive documents relating to military and diplomatic matters. 
Over time, this exceptional justiﬁ cation ceases to exist. 
2.13. The Russian authorities claimed that one of the major obstacles to the in-
vestigation into the Katyń massacre was the destruction of the prisoners’ personal 
ﬁ les. The applicants’ counsels have serious doubts as to the indispensability of this 
material for the success of the investigation. However, in this context let us recall 
– although it is not a strictly legal argument – the words of Mikhail Bulgakov, 
the great Russian writer: “archives don’t burn”. The allegation that the personal 
ﬁ les of prisoners were destroyed has never been substantiated. Reasons therefore 
exist for doubting the assertion of the Russian authorities. Firstly, the authorities 
have never shown the routine protocols of destruction of ﬁ les. Secondly, in the 
1990s, when Russian-Polish co-operation with regard to the Katyń massacre was 
proceeding smoothly, the Russian partners assured their Polish colleagues, albeit 
unoﬃ  cially, that the ﬁ les of Polish prisoners of war – not only those killed in 1940 
but all of them – still existed and were divided into four diﬀ erent categories.
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2.14. Lastly, eﬀ ective investigation must be directed, by the use of all available 
measures, towards the identiﬁ cation of perpetrators and bringing them to justice. 
As the case ﬁ le is secret, we do not know who has been declared responsible for the 
Katyń massacre and on which grounds. However, we know that the Katyń mas-
sacre was classiﬁ ed as an abuse of power. This classiﬁ cation entirely disregards the 
precepts of international law, which in 1940 already treated killing of prisoners of 
war as a war crime. Moreover, at the time when it was committed this crime was 
not subject to statute of limitation (we refer in this context to the ﬁ ndings of the 
Court in the Kononov judgement, § 230).
2.15. If the Katyń massacre had been given the adequate legal classiﬁ cation, i.e. 
being declared an imprescriptible crime of international law, the Russian authori-
ties should have pursued a criminal prosecution of the key organisers and per-
petrators as long as they live. In this context it is worth mentioning that in the 
1990s still alive were such persons as Lazar Kaganovitch, member of the Soviet 
Politburo, who on 5 March 1940 made the decision to execute Polish citizens, and 
Piotr Soprunienko, in 1940 head of the Administration for Prisoners of War and 
Internees Aﬀ airs. 
Conclusion: Russian investigation no. 159 did not meet the very basic re-
quirements for being declared eﬀ ective. The applicants were not given in-
jured party status, their rights to participate in the investigation were not 
safeguarded properly, and – a fact which became particularly important 
when the Russian authorities reversed the original version of the tragic 
events – evidence was not collected from the applicants, basic evidentiary 
measures (e.g. excavation works) were not undertaken, and the adequate 
legal classiﬁ cation was not given to the Katyń massacre.
Article 3 of the Convention
3. Did the Russian authorities subject the applicants to a form of degrading treatment 
in breach of Article 3 of the Convention in connection with the applicants’ attempts 
to obtain information about the fate of their relatives and the way in which the Russian 
authorities treated those enquiries?
3.1. In their written submissions the applicants’ counsels have already referred 
to the Court’s case law on Article 3. It is therefore pointless to repeat these argu-
ments at the hearing. We will only respectfully remind the Court of some elements 
pertinent to the allegations concerning Article 3.
3.2. The Court emphasised in its case law that the essence of violations of Article 3 
does not so much lie in the fact of the “disappearance” or killing of the family 
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member (in “inherent” emotional suﬀ ering concomitant with killing or disap-
pearance) but rather concerns the authorities’ reactions and attitudes to this situ-
ation when it is brought to their attention (e.g. Çakıcı, para. 98).
3.3. It sometimes happens that “disappeared persons” become “dead persons” 
when the bodies of those who disappeared are found. The peculiarity of the Katyń 
case is that the sequence of “ﬁ rst disappeared, then dead” is reversed. Those who 
were “dead” became the “disappeared”. 
3.4. When in the 1990s Mrs. Wołk and her daughter Mrs. Wołk−Jezierska en-
quired of the Russian Chief Military Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce about the rehabilitation 
of their husband and father they were informed that Lieutenant Wołk had been 
executed by the NKVD and his rehabilitation would be decided when investiga-
tion no. 159 was ﬁ nished. The Russian authorities did not question the fact that 
Mr. Wołk had been executed in 1940 and that this had taken place during the 
Katyń massacre.
3.5. In reply to the requests lodged twice (2005 and 2007) by the applicants 
after investigation no. 159 was discontinued, the Chief Military Prosecutor’s 
Oﬃ  ce also conﬁ rmed that the death penalty had been carried out on the appli-
cants’ relatives. 
3.6. In response to the request ﬁ led in 2008 by Mrs. Anna Stavitskaya, the Rus-
sian advocate for the applicants, the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce stated, 
among the reasons for rejecting the rehabilitation request, that the applicants’ 
relatives had not been identiﬁ ed in the course of investigation no. 159. 
3.7. In the course of the subsequent court proceedings the Moscow Circuit Mili-
tary Court stated in its judgement of 14 October 2008 (upheld by the Military 
Division of the Supreme Court on 29 January 2009) that it had not been estab-
lished what had happened to the applicants’ relatives who in 1940 were held in 
the special POW camps at Kozelsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkov, after they had left 
those camps and been handed over “to the disposal” of the regional NKVD com-
missions. Although the transfer of prisoners of war had taken place in pursuance 
of the decision of the Politburo of the Communist Party to exterminate Polish 
prisoners and those people had been delivered to the locations where executions 
were carried out, their fate was declared unknown.
3.8. Such statements, enunciated in sheer denial of the very basic facts and the 
previous assertions of Chief Military Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce, must be considered 
as inﬂ icting grave moral pain, anguish and stress on the applicants. By way of 
comparison, bearing in mind the established legal and historical standards, one 
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could not even imagine that a post-war German public institution might state to 
a group of relatives of Holocaust victims that such victims must be considered 
unaccounted-for as their fate could be traced only to the dead-end track of Bir-
kenau. As a result, the competent State authorities are unable to unearth what 
may subsequently have happened to that group at Auschwitz, insofar as there 
exist no documents on their whereabouts (or because the documents have been 
destroyed by the Nazi authorities). Such a statement would clearly amount to an 
act of degrading and inhuman treatment.
We are clearly mindful of the diﬀ erences between the Holocaust and the 
Katyń massacre. It is important to point out, however, that the destiny of those 
reaching the dead-end track of Birkenau and that of Gniezdovo (adjacent to Katyń) 
was equally tragic, with only one exception in the latter case. As the tragic events of 
the Holocaust and the Katyń massacre are well established, any statement of State 
authorities denying the reality of these two atrocities must bring about extreme dis-
tress, anguish and emotional suﬀ ering to relatives of the victims.
3.9. In response to the requests for rehabilitation the applicants were informed 
that the Chief Military Prosecution Oﬃ  ce was unable to establish – as the personal 
ﬁ les of prisoners had allegedly been destroyed – “which provision of the Penal 
Code formed the legal basis for calling the prisoner to account”. 
3.10. The motives given by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce to support its 
decisions, which were upheld by the courts, demonstrate that the Chief Military 
Prosecution Oﬃ  ce assumed that in the case of the victims of the Katyń massacre, 
who had been murdered in violation of the elementary rules of international hu-
manitarian law and following a special extra-judicial procedure contrary even to 
Soviet legislation, there might have existed due reasons for the execution. This is 
tantamount to an allegation that the victims were criminals who deserved capital 
punishment.
3.11. We would also like to respectfully draw the Court’s attention to certain facts 
occurring in the proceedings for rehabilitation. Firstly, the Moscow Circuit Court 
in its judgement of 16 May 2008 stated – while dismissing an appeal against the 
decision on rehabilitation – that the only persons entitled to institute the appeal 
action were the victims of the repression themselves, i.e. the executed Polish oﬃ  cers. 
Secondly, in his submissions before the Moscow Circuit Court of Khamovniki Pros-
ecutor Blizyeyev, acting on behalf of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce, argued 
that even if “hypothetically” the Polish oﬃ  cers “may have been killed” by organs of 
the Soviet state, there existed “due reasons” for the repression, as “some” Polish of-
ﬁ cers were “spies, terrorists and saboteurs” and the Polish pre-war army “had been 
trained to ﬁ ght against the Soviet Union” (court sitting on 24 October 2008).
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3.12. There is abundant evidence allowing reconstruction of the circumstances of 
the Katyń massacre and conﬁ rming the death of the applicants’ close relatives. The 
names of the ten prisoners of war have been inscribed on the memorials erected 
in the burial places. The bodies of the three prisoners of war killed in Katyń – Mr. 
Wołk, Mr. Rodowicz and Mr. Mielecki – were identiﬁ ed during the excavations in 
1943. Despite all that evidence, the applicants heard in 2008 that their relatives 
had “disappeared” in the spring of 1940. They also heard that if they were execut-
ed in 1940 there may have existed “due reasons” for the killing of the POWs. 
3.13. The hypothesis of “disappearance” evoked by the Russian authorities must 
also bring about anguish and pain to the applicants because it resembles a well-
known statement made by Joseph Stalin during a meeting on 3 December 1941 
with Władysław Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister of the Government-in-Exile. 
When asked about the fate of Polish soldiers held by the Soviets in the camps for 
POWs, Stalin answered that those still unaccounted-for “could have ﬂ ed to Man-
churia” (minutes of talks conducted in the Kremlin on 2 December 1941).
3.14. The anguish, pain and moral suﬀ ering of the applicants cannot be classi-
ﬁ ed as simply and inherently accompanying the killings themselves. It resulted 
from the treatment the applicants experienced from the Russian authorities when 
the applicants lodged their legal requests. Another factor relevant in the context 
of Article 3 is the age of the applicants and the fact that for most of the persons 
executed were fathers whom they do not remember or never had the chance to see.
Conclusions: the treatment of the applicants was degrading and inhu-
man, and amounted to a violation of Article 3. Their anguish and suﬀ er-
ing clearly went beyond the emotional distress normally accompanying 
the killing of a close relative. The source of this anguish and suﬀ ering 
was the way the Russian authorities reacted to the applicants’ enquiries 
about the fate of their close relatives.
Article 38 of the Convention
4. As regards the Russian Government’s refusal to furnish a copy of the decision of 
21 September 2004 as requested by the Court, was their reference to the provisions 
of national law preventing conﬁ dential information from being communicated to 
international organisations compatible with their obligations under Article 38 of 
the Convention read in the light of Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justiﬁ cation for its failure to perform a treaty”)?
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4.1. The rule expressed in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) is broadly considered as a reﬂ ection of the longstanding princi-
ple of customary international law (M. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Leiden 2009, p. 375 and further references). In 
accordance with this principle no internal rule, even of constitutional rank, can be 
invoked as an excuse for the non-observance of international law. Article 27 VCTL 
applies only to contractual international obligations and is narrower than the cus-
tomary principle of precedence of all binding norms of international law over any 
rule of domestic legal order. 
4.2. The principle that, in international terms, the provisions of domestic law 
may not prevail over international obligations, goes back to the Alabama Claims 
Arbitration of 1872. In the arbitration proceedings that followed the use of 
a British shipyard by the American Confederates to transform a commercial ves-
sel into a warship that subsequently sank a number of Union vessels, it was ruled 
that “the government of Her Britannic Majesty cannot justify itself for a failure in 
due diligence of the plea of insuﬃ  ciency of the legal means of action which it pos-
sessed (...) It is plain that to satisfy the exigency of due diligence, and to escape 
liability, a neutral government must take care (...) that its municipal law shall pro-
hibit acts contravening neutrality” (J.B. Moore, International Arbitration, New York 
1898, vol. 1, p. 653).
4.3. The predominant position of international law vis-á-vis domestic legislation 
was declared in several rulings of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ). 
• In the Treatment of Polish Nationals case the PCIJ denied the Polish Gov-
ernment the right to submit to organs of the League of Nations questions 
concerning the application to Polish nationals of certain provisions of the 
Constitution of the Free City of Danzig, on the grounds that:
 “according to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against 
another State, on the provisions of the latter’s Constitution, but only on inter-
national law and international obligations duly accepted (...) [C]onversely, 
a State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with 
a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law or 
treaties in force. Applying these principles to the present case, it results that 
the question of the treatment of Polish nationals and other persons of Polish 
origin or speech must be settled exclusively on the basis of the rules of inter-
national law and the treaty provisions in force between Poland and Danzig. 
 The application of the Danzig Constitution may (...) result in the violation 
of an international obligation incumbent on Danzig towards Poland, whether 
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under treaty stipulations or under general international law (...) However, in 
cases of such a nature, it is not the Constitution and other laws, as such, but the 
international obligation that gives rise to the responsibility of the Free City”;13
• Greco-Bulgarian “Communities” Case:
 “it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in the relations 
between Powers who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions of mu-
nicipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty”;14
• Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex Case: 
 “it is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the scope 
of her international obligations;15
• Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations Case:
 “a State which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make 
in its legislation such modiﬁ cations as may be necessary to ensure the fulﬁ l-
ment of the obligations undertaken. (...) the contracting Parties are obliged 
to bring their legislation into harmony with the Convention [of Lausanne of 
30 January 1923], that that instrument must be construed as implicitly referring 
to national legislation in so far as that is not contrary to the Convention”;16
• Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig Case;17
• In the Wimbledon case the PCIJ held that conformity with internal law 
does not preclude State conduct being characterised as wrongful under 
international law:
 “a neutrality order, issued by an individual State, could not prevail over the 
provisions of the Treaty of Peace. (...) under Article 380 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, it was [Germany’s] deﬁ nite duty to allow [the passage of the 
Wimbledon through the Kiel Canal]. She could not advance her neutrality 
orders against the obligations which she had accepted under this Article”.18
4.4. In the post-war period the International Court of Justice referred and applied 
the same principle in a number of cases:
13  Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the 
Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932, Series A/B, No. 44, pp. 24-25.
14  Greco-Bulgarian “Communities”, Advisory Opinion, 1930, Series B, No. 17, p. 32.
15  Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 6 December 1930, 
Series A, No. 24, p. 12; and Judgment, 1932, Series A/B, No. 46, p. 167.
16  Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, 1925, Series B, 
No. 10, pp. 20-21.
17  Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928, Series B, No. 15, 
pp. 26–27.
18  S.S. “Wimbledon”, 1923, Series A, No. 1, pp. 29-30.
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• Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Case (Case of the PLO Mission); 
“It would be suﬃ  cient to recall the fundamental principle of international law 
that international law prevails over domestic law”;19
• In the same sense: Fisheries (Judgement, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 132); Not-
tebohm (Preliminary Objection, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1953, p. 123); 
Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of In-
fants (Judgement, ICJ Reports 1958, p. 67); also: Reparation for Injuries 
case (Reparation for Injuries Suﬀ ered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 184) and Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. 
case (Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgement, 
ICJ Reports 1989, para. 73);
• In the LaGrand Case the ECJ held that the US constitutional procedural 
rule of “procedural default” may not prevail over the obligations incum-
bent under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;20 
this reasoning was then followed in the Avena and Other Mexican Nation-
als case.21
4.5. The principle that internal law may not prevail over international law and do-
mestic provisions may not serve as an excuse for evading international obligations 
was introduced in the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States prepared 
by the International Law Commission (1949), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1949, pp. 286-290; the Declaration was prepared in conformity with 
resolution 178 (II) of the General Assembly (21 November 1947). Article 13 of 
the Draft Declaration provided that: “Every State has the duty to carry out in good 
faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and 
it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to 
perform this duty”.
Article 13 of the Draft Declaration made the principle in question closely 
related to another fundamental principle of international law: that of acting in 
good faith and respecting obligations (pacta sunt servanda). 
4.6. The drafting history of Article 27 VCLT shows that it resulted from an amend-
ment proposed by the Pakistani delegation to draft Article 23 on pacta sunt serv-
anda and was modelled on Article 13 of the Draft Declaration. Among the States 
19  Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations 
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, para. 57.
20  LaGrand Case (Germany v. USA), ICJ Reports 2001, para. 90-91.
21  Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. USA), ICJ Reports 2004, 
para. 112.
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which decidedly supported the amendment was the USSR. After the amendment 
draft Article 23 provided that:
“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith, and no party may invoke the provisions of its constitu-
tion or its laws as an excuse for its failure to perform this duty”.
The proposal was accepted on ﬁ rst reading by 55 votes in favour, none 
against, 30 abstentions (Vienna Conference, First Session, p. 158). 
4.7. Article 27 was adopted by 73 votes in favour, 2 against, 24 abstentions 
(Vienna Conference, Second Session, p. 54). Only two States – Venezuela and Iran 
– expressed their opposition, suggesting the primacy of their constitutional law 
over treaties. 
4.8. Only two States − Guatemala and Costa Rica – formulated reservations to Ar-
ticle 27, claiming the primacy of their constitutions. Subsequently several States 
raised objections to these reservations.
4.9. Article 27 or − more generally − the prohibition to invoke domestic law as 
an excuse for evading international obligations was referred to and applied in the 
practice of various international bodies and institutions.
4.10. Human Rights Committee: 
• General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obliga-
tion Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, adopted on 29 March 2004 
(2187th meeting):
 4. The obligations of the Covenant in general and article 2 in particular are 
binding on every State Party as a whole. All branches of government (executive, 
legislative and judicial), and other public or governmental authorities, at 
whatever level – national, regional or local – are in a position to engage the 
responsibility of the State Party. The executive branch that usually repre-
sents the State Party internationally, including before the Committee, may 
not point to the fact that an action incompatible with the provisions of the 
Covenant was carried out by another branch of government as a means of 
seeking to relieve the State Party from responsibility for the action and con-
sequent incompatibility. This understanding ﬂ ows directly from the principle 
contained in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ac-
cording to which a State Party ‘may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justiﬁ cation for its failure to perform a treaty’. Although Article 2, 
Paragraph 2, allows States Parties to give eﬀ ect to Covenant rights in accord-
ance with domestic constitutional processes, the same principle operates so as 
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to prevent States parties from invoking provisions of the constitutional law 
or other aspects of domestic law to justify a failure to perform or give eﬀ ect 
to obligations under the treaty. In this respect, the Committee reminds States 
Parties with a federal structure of the terms of Article 50, according to which 
the Covenant’s provisions ‘shall extend to all parts of federal states without 
any limitations or exceptions’.
4.11. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
• General comment No. 9, The domestic application of the Covenant, adopted 
on 3 December 1998, E/C.12/1998/24:
 3. Questions relating to the domestic application of the Covenant must be con-
sidered in the light of two principles of international law. The ﬁ rst, as reﬂ ected 
in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is that “[A] 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justiﬁ cation for its 
failure to perform a treaty”. In other words, States should modify the domestic 
legal order as necessary in order to give eﬀ ect to their treaty obligations. 
4.12. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
• Prosecutor v. Blaškić (IT 95-14-T), decision of 3 April 1996 made by 
President Antonio Cassese (Application to vary conditions of detention), 
(paras. 8-11), ILR 1998, vol. 108, p. 69: 
 “all States have been under an unquestionable obligation to enact any imple-
menting legislation necessary to permit them to execute warrants and requests 
of the Tribunal.”
• Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Decision on preliminary motions, 8 No-
vember 2001, para. 47:
 47. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is also rel-
evant. It provides: a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justiﬁ cation for its failure to perform a treaty. 
 The Statute of the International Tribunal is interpreted as a treaty. The Feder-
al Republic of Yugoslavia has an obligation under the Statute to comply with 
the request to arrest and transfer the accused and, therefore, cannot rely on its 
internal law, namely the division of power as between the federal government 
and its States as a justiﬁ cation for failure to comply.
4.13. Committee Against Torture
• Communication No. 181/2001: Senegal, 19 May 2006:
 9.8 The Committee considers that the State party cannot invoke the complex-
ity of its judicial proceedings or other reasons stemming from domestic law to 
justify its failure to comply with (...) obligations under the Convention.
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4.14. Inter-American Court on Human Rights:
• Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of 9 December 1994 on International 
Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Viola-
tion of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights), requested by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights [116 ILR 320]. It was stated that:
 35. International obligations and the responsibilities arising from the breach 
thereof are another matter. Pursuant to international law, all obligations im-
posed by it must be fulﬁ lled in good faith; domestic law may not be invoked 
to justify non-fulﬁ lment. These rules may be deemed to be general principles 
of law and have been applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
and the International Court of Justice even in cases involving constitutional 
provisions (...). These rules have also been codiﬁ ed in Articles 26 and 27 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
• Resolution of 17 November 1999 on the compliance by the State of Peru 
with the judgement on the Court’s ruling on the merits of the Case Cas-
tillo Petruzzi and Others against Peru, points 3-5.
4.15. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights:
• Communication 313/05 – Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana, 47th 
Ordinary Session, held from 12-26 May 2010, the Commission stated:
 139. The Respondent State further contends that for the legislative, execu-
tive and judicial organs of a State Party, a treaty is infrequently assessed in 
the hierarchy of legal norms applicable in the domestic legal order and as 
a consequence, treaties are sometimes deemed inapplicable if they conﬂ ict 
with the constitutional provisions of a state. Thus, in Botswana, treaties do 
not confer enforceable rights on individuals until passed into law by Parlia-
ment. However, they may be used as an aid to construction of laws including 
the Constitution.
 239. It is also a well established principle in international law that a state 
cannot invoke its domestic laws to avoid its international obligations.
• In Communication 211/98, Legal Resource Foundation v. Zambia, 29th 
Ordinary Session, held from 23 April to 7 May 2001; the Commission 
reiterated that: 
 “international treaties which are not part of domestic law and which may not 
be directly enforceable in the national courts nonetheless impose obligations 
on State Parties” (para. 60).
4.16. The principle in question was also applied by numerous arbitrate tribunals. 
• Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v. United States of America), 
UNRIAA, vol. I (Sales No. 1948.V.2), p. 331 (1922); Aguilar-Amory and 
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Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Tinoco case) (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 
ibid., p. 386 (1923); Shufeldt Claim, ibid., vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1), 
p. 1098 (“it is a settled principle of international law that a sovereign cannot 
be permitted to set up one of his own municipal laws as a bar to a claim by 
a sovereign for a wrong done to the latter’s subject”) (1930); Wollemborg 
Case, ibid., vol. XIV (Sales No. 65.V.4), p. 289 (1956) (“one thing is cer-
tain: the Italian Government cannot avail itself, before an international court, 
of its domestic law to avoid fulﬁ lling an accepted international obligation”); 
and Flegenheimer Case, ibid., p. 360 (1958);
• International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established 
by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa 
Assets LP v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3), 22 May 2007: 
 208. It must be noted also that the very legal system of the Argentine Re-
public, like many modern systems, provides for a prominent role of treaties 
under both Articles 27 and 31 of the Constitution. Treaties are constitu-
tionally recognised among the sources considered “the supreme law of the 
Nation”. It follows that in case of conﬂ ict between a treaty rule and an 
inconsistent rule of domestic law, the former will prevail. This is not just 
the consequence of the Constitution so providing, but also the solution dic-
tated by Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in that 
a State “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justiﬁ cation for 
its failure to perform a treaty”.
4.17. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111 
cmt. a (1987): 
 “[F]ailure of the United States to carry out an obligation [of international 
law] on the ground of its unconstitutionality will not relieve the United States 
of responsibility under international law.”
4.18. Article 27 VCLT corresponds to Article 4 of the Draft Articles on Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International 
Law Commission, which provides that: “The characterisation of an act of a State as 
internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterisation is not 
aﬀ ected by the characterisation of the same act as lawful by internal law”.
4.19. The position of international courts summarised above is accepted by the 
doctrine of international law. E.g. in P. Malenczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduc-
tion to International Law New York 1997, 7th ed.), it is stated that:
 “the general rule of international law is that a State cannot plead a rule of or 
a gap in its own municipal law as a defence to a claim based on international 
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law. (...) This is particularly true when (...) a treaty or other rule of inter-
national law imposes an obligation on States to enact a particular rule as 
part of their municipal law. A similar rule can be found in Article 27 (...) in 
other words, all that international law says is that States cannot invoke their 
internal law and procedures as a justiﬁ cation for not complying with their 
international obligations. States are required to perform their international 
obligations in good faith, but they are not at liberty to decide on the modali-
ties of such performance within their domestic legal systems. Similarly, there 
is a general duty for States to bring their domestic law into conformity with 
obligations under international law” (p. 64).
4.20. Question no. 4 of this Court relates speciﬁ cally to the refusal of the Russian 
Government to submit a copy of the decision of 21 September 2004. At the outset 
it should be stressed that the Respondent Government relies on its ordinary leg-
islation provisions but not on any constitutional rule (a fact which motivated the 
government of Venezuela and those of Guatemala and Costa Rica to respectively 
vote against Article 27 and formulate reservations to it). 
4.21. State secret privilege is deﬁ ned as “a long-standing evidentiary privilege that 
permits governments to resist discovery of evidence if disclosure reasonably could be 
seen as threat to military or diplomatic interest of nation” (Henry C. Black, Black’s 
Law Dictionary, St. Paul 1990, 6th ed., p. 1409). Therefore, the refusal must have 
two features: it must be related to military or diplomatic interests (but not to all 
security concerns as such) and additionally must be reasonable.
4.22. On several occasions international tribunals were confronted with refusals 
to submit the requested documents. 
4.23. In Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
requested that the government of Honduras produce evidence concerning the 
structure of a certain unit of the national armed forces. The government averred 
that the evidence sought was closely related to the security of the State. Neverthe-
less, the government did not refuse to produce the evidence and was permitted 
by the Court, upon request, to present the testimony in a closed session due to 
“strict security reasons of the State of Honduras” (judg. of 20 January 1989, Ser. C 
No. 5, § 33-35).
4.24. In 1972, in the Ballo case before the Administrative Tribunal of the Inter-
national Labour Organisation UNESCO, as respondent organisation, declined 
to make some ﬁ les available to the Tribunal. UNESCO held that the requested 
documents were either conﬁ dential or not relevant to Mr. Ballo’s situation. How-
ever, when the Tribunal repeated its request the ﬁ les were submitted by UNESCO 
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and inspected in camera. Noting subsequently that the documents were indeed 
of a conﬁ dential character, the Tribunal decided not to communicate them to the 
complainant and merely informed him of the tentative conclusions which it had 
drawn from them (ILO Administrative Tribunal, Ballo v. UNESCO, judg. No. 191, 
15 May 1972, International Labour Oﬃ  ce, Oﬃ  cial Bulletin, vol. LV, Nos. 2, 3 
and 4, 1972, p. 227). 
Other cases of this kind, decided in an analogous way by the Administra-
tive Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation, are Molina, Judgement 
No. 440 [1980] (WHO) and Alikhan, ILO AT Judgement No. 556 [1983] (ILO).
4.25. The issue of access to conﬁ dential information also arose in the so-called 
Sabotage cases in the 1930s (concerning two destructive acts of sabotage committed 
by German agents during the period of American neutrality in 1916 and 1917), 
brought before the United States–German Mixed Claims Commission. When the 
German legal agent requested the inspection of certain ﬁ les of the United States 
Department of Justice, the Umpire dismissed the request. Before taking this deci-
sion, however, the Umpire had visited the United States Attorney-General and 
examined the ﬁ les on his own. Having inspected the ﬁ les, he was satisﬁ ed that 
they actually contained information pertinent to the State’s security. 
4.26. On the other hand, the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Chan-
nel case did not draw any negative inference when the United Kingdom refused 
to submit the requested evidence, which it considered related to naval secrecy 
(judgement of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 32). 
4.27. The objection founded on the Corfu judgement was raised by Croatia in the 
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić case before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia. When the Tribunal issued subpoenae duces tecum, request-
ing, among others, some documents and evidence of a military character, the Gov-
ernment of Croatia challenged this decision by referring to the protection of its 
national security. Croatia alleged that determination of whether national security 
interests are involved should be left solely to the State concerned.
4.28. The Tribunal dismissed these allegations ﬁ rst as a chamber (Decision of 
18 July 1997 on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of 
Subpoenae Duces Tecum) and then as an appeals chamber (Judgement of 29 Octo-
ber 1997 on the request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of 
Trial Chamber of 18 July 1997). 
4.29. The Tribunal’s rulings were based on three principal grounds. Firstly, reli-
ance on the Corfu case was considered inappropriate. Article 49 of the Statute of 
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the International Court of Justice is couched in non-mandatory terms,22 whereas 
Article 29 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia is worded in strong mandatory language (para. 62 AC). Secondly, the 
Statute and the Rules of the Yugoslavia Tribunal do not envisage any exceptions 
to the obligation of States to co-operate with the Tribunal (para. 112 Ch, para. 
63 AC). Thirdly, a blanket right of States to withhold, for security reasons, docu-
ments necessary for proceedings might jeopardise the very function of the Tribu-
nal (para. 147 Ch, para. 65 AC). 
4.30. At the same time the Tribunal stressed that the validity of State security 
concerns can be scrutinised by procedural arrangements, such as in camera pro-
ceedings and various modalities related to communicating and recording of docu-
ments considered sensitive.
4.31. The applicants’ counsels respectfully submit that the reasons enunciated by 
the Yugoslavia Tribunal apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Court. Article 38 of the 
Convention is worded in mandatory language, does not provide for any excep-
tions, and a blanket right of States may endanger the very function of the Court. 
Simultaneously, security concerns of States can be assessed and secured by appli-
cation of Rule 33 of Rules of the Court and other speciﬁ c arrangements the Court 
might ﬁ nd proper.
4.32. In the later case of Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez the Yugosla-
via Tribunal held that the question of the relevance of the requested documents 
for the proceedings falls into the full discretion of the Tribunal and cannot be 
challenged by States. The Tribunal declared that: “it falls squarely within the dis-
cretion of the Trial Chamber to determine whether the documents sought are relevant 
to the trial. Furthermore, the State from whom the documents are requested does not 
have locus standi to challenge their relevance” (Decision of 9 September 1999 on 
the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of a Binding Order, para. 40).
Conclusion: the applicants’ counsels respectfully submit that in the light 
of the case law of various international tribunals and bodies, as well as 
the case law of this Court, the refusal of the Russian Government con-
stituted a violation of Article 38 of the Convention as read in the light 
of Article 27 VCLT.
Written by Ireneusz Kamiński
22  Article 49: “The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents to pro-
duce any document or to supply any explanations. Formal note shall be taken of any refusal.” 
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